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Ontology after Carnap, edited by Stephan Blatti and Sandra Lapointe, is a collection of eleven new 
essays by leading scholars on, as the title suggests, Carnap and ontology. They bear the mark of 
contemporary professional scholarship and thus they will become a major reference point for both 
metaphysicians and analytic philosophers in general. 
 
One should be cautious, however, both with ‘Carnap’ and ‘ontology’ as they are treated in 
the volume. Ontology usually accounts for what there is. In it, ‘questions about what exists and about 
the properties and relations of various existents are posed and answered.’ (1). By ontology, on the 
other hand, one often means those investigations whose subject is ontology itself—this is usually 
called metaontology, or more broadly metametaphysics. In most cases, the chapters of the reviewed 
volume are related to this field and do not argue for the (non-)existence of a certain type of entities 
(as one would expect from a so-called first-order ontological investigation). 
 
Though metaontological questions and debates provide the core questions of contemporary 
metaphysicians, the main motivation behind the volume is the renewed interest in Carnap’s 
philosophy and particularly the exploration of ‘what insights a Carnapian approach might offer to 
contemporary work in metaontology’ (6). Carnap defended a certain form of deflationism which 
states that metaphysical questions are not substantive and cognitive ones which purport to describe 
reality as it is. His Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology [ESO] paper from 1950 is treated as the 
magnum opus of his position. 
 
The Carnapian approach looks like this: facing the ontological question ‘Are there F-s?’ one 
shall say that taking it internally to a linguistic framework, it is answerable either by logical-
mathematical means (the answer is then analytic, but not trivial!) or by empirical and experiential 
means (the answer is then synthetic). There is no need for any non-analytic and non-empirical 
metaphysical insights or special philosophical tools. But taking the question externally to any 
framework, if you still go after whether there are F-s, then you ask a pseudo-question without any 
cognitive and factual content. However, if you ask the external question as whether one should accept 
a given framework or not, that is, whether to use the framework of F-s (like numbers, things, events, 
etc.), you ask a legitimate and meaningful question of a pragmatic kind. You accept the linguistic 
framework of abstract entities (like sets and propositions) not because there really are abstract objects 
in a mind and language independent way, but because their introduction is expedient. 
 
All of the chapters of Ontology after Carnap examine this scheme in its Carnapian and in its 
current neo-Carnapian version—either in a positive or negative manner. While Thomas Hofweber, 
Robert Kraut, Stephen Biggs and Jessica Wilson, Amie Thomasson, Richard Creath, and partly 
Gregory Lavers and Eli Hirsch argue for a Carnapian point of view, Simon Evnine, Matti Eklund, 
and Kathrin Koslicki raise some important issues against the deflationist approach pursued by and 
on the basis of Carnap. (Alan Sidelle’s article is an interpretative one). The volume contains not just 
generally opposed articles, but documents some interesting inner tensions as well. 
 
Hofweber claims, for example, that though Carnap’s ‘big idea’ about the different readings 
of the ontological questions is ‘exactly correct’ (13), it does not have to lead us to the rejection of a  
 





genuine metaphysics. A similar point is presented by Stephen Biggs and Jessica Wilson, who argues  
in their chapter that ‘the most promising (and most Carnapian!) post-Kripke version of Carnap’s 
semantics—abductive two-dimensionalism—presupposes an epistemology which undermines 
Carnap’s metaphysical anti-realism’ (81, emphasis in the original). In addition, as a culmination of 
her investigation pursued in recent years, Amie Thomasson discusses the easy approach to 
ontology—a deflationist account of metaphysics on Carnapian lines. 
 
Others debate these accounts and maintains an anti-realist or anti-metaphysical Carnap 
picture (Kraut, Creath, Lavers), or disputes the neo-Carnapian accounts like Thomasson’s (Evnine, 
Eklund). It can be seen that metaontology is indeed a lively field of philosophical discussion and 
contemporary scholars do their best to prove their points. The most Carnapian point of view might 
be to say that everyone shall choose according to her/his best interest and goals. In metaphysics, there 
are no morals (to paraphrase Carnap’s famous principle of tolerance). 
 
There are serious issues and problems, however, with the general outlook of the volume. 
After the editors and many of the contributors declared that they are not interested in and hence not 
doing historical exegesis it would be unfair to complain about the unhistorical character of the 
chapters. But the often inaccurate picture of Carnap dealt with in the volume, stemming from the 
historically unsatisfactory approach to Carnap, is another thing. 
 
Regarding the context of its origins, the editors claim that the ESO was produced as a 
response to Quine’s challenge in his famous ‘On What There Is’ (2). In that article, Quine argued 
that by accepting abstract entities, Carnap was driven to (unacceptable) Platonism. In ESO, however, 
though Carnap mentions the problem of abstract entities in mathematics and Quine’s article, he also 
declares that they resolved the debate regarding ontology, and since Quine accepted abstract entities 
right after his article (in 1948), Carnap would have known about it given their continuous and detailed 
correspondence. 
 
Carnap’s article was much more guidance for his empiricist friends (as the first passage of 
ESO says), especially for Ernest Nagel, but it would have been useful also for Otto Neurath, though 
he died in 1945. It was Neurath, however, who attacked Carnap most vehemently for pursuing 
semantics, dealing with denotation, reference, truth, meaning and satisfaction. Carnap referred to 
Neurath indirectly already in Introduction to Semantics (1942) and Nagel reviewed that book quite 
negatively. Carnap’s aims were thus to show that one could be a semanticist and an empiricist at the 
same time. The occurrence of ontological questions regarding abstract entities (most notably 
propositions) is not threatening of a viable and coherent empiricist philosophy of science. 
 
It is important to note the original historical circumstances of the article, because as Creath 
(198) notes, ‘it would be more accurate to say that Carnap wants to transform the discussion of 
philosophical ontology rather than to dismiss it’ (emphasis in the original) That is, he wanted to show 
to his empiricist friends that the ontological questions and entities they fear have a legitimate context 
and field of application—thus he also gives a pragmatist turn to his earlier ‘attitude-towards-life’ 
conception from 1932. 
 
It is also instructive to consult not just the original text but other writings of Carnap as well 
(most of the papers refer only to ESO), because despite appearances (as in the article of Hirsch and  
 





Biggs/Wilson), Carnap was not concerned with verificationism in 1950. He left that conception 
behind already in the mid-1930s, thus considering and attacking verificationism seems to be just a  
red herring. Therefore it is also irrelevant to talk about Carnap’s antirealism since, as he declares in 
ESO, he is not an irrealist in the usual sense since antirealism is just another pseudo-position like 
realism (Biggs/Wilson treat Carnap as an antirealist in the volume). 
 
One reason for invoking verificationism and epistemology in the context of ESO is Carnap’s 
maintenance of the idea that some evidence is required to settle the dispute between nominalist and 
realist regarding the existence of numbers; and since there is no evidence acceptable for both parties, 
their debate is a pseudo one. The nature and idea of the required evidence are treated in greater length 
by Creath and Biggs/Wilson, but it should be mention that the notion of “evidence” could be 
understood in many ways: as inductive-statistical data, as theoretical virtues, as falsifying evidence, 
as intersubjectively gathered experiential results or even shared intuitions. Verification is not a 
necessary corollary of evidence. 
 
At one point, Robert Kraut (39) says ‘historical accuracy aside’ and that could be the motto 
of the volume as well. There are exceptions of course: Lavers, Creath, and Sidelle do a great job to 
invoke Carnap, replacing the volume’s ‘Carnap,’ but it is Amie Thomasson who does the most: she 
provided not just a historically sensitive and reflexive picture of Carnap, but also describes some 
interesting ways how Carnap was dropped from the philosophical canon and how the negligence 
transformed a viable position into a dogmatically rejected conception. 
 
Regarding the editorial work, two things should be noted. Firstly, the internal reference form 
of the chapters is not united. Though it seems to be just a formal matter, it documents a deeper 
pattern: many internal references (from one chapter to another) are wrong: it seems that the given 
page numbers are in some cases from earlier page-proofs and in some cases they refer to the 
presumably internally circulated manuscripts, thus it is much harder to track down those arguments 
and passages that the other author in the volume criticizes. 
 
In the end, Ontology after Carnap is an important document in metaontology and 
metametaphysics. One will find there many insightful and detailed arguments against and for 
deflationism and will get a sense of what is at stake now in the fields of ontology. It will provoke 
many debates among philosophers but those scholars who are interested in historically sensitive 
pictures of philosophers and positions should take it with a grain of salt. Ontology after Carnap 
would be better entitled as ‘Contemporary Debates about Metaontological Deflationism’—not so 
seductive sounding but more accurate. 
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